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The East China Sea Disputes: 
History, Status, and Ways Forward
Mark J. Valencia
The dispute over ownership of islands, maritime boundaries, juris-
diction, perhaps as much as 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent, and
other nonliving and living marine resources in the East China Sea
continues to bedevil China-Japan relations. Historical and cultural
factors, such as the legacy of World War II and burgeoning nation-
alism, are significant factors in the dispute. Indeed, the dispute
seems to have become a contest between national identities. The
approach to the issue has been a political dance by the two coun-
tries: one step forward, two steps back. In this article I explain the
East China Sea dispute, explore its effect on China-Japan relations,
and suggest ways forward. KEYWORDS: China-Japan relations, terri-
torial disputes, nationalism.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) AND
Japan are perhaps at their lowest ebb since relations were for-
mally reestablished in 1972. The dispute over islets and maritime
claims in the East China Sea has triggered much of this recent
deterioration. Because of the dispute, China has canceled or
refused many exchanges and meetings of high-level officials,
including summit meetings. In fact, China has said that a summit
meeting cannot take place until or unless Japan acknowledges that
a dispute over sovereignty and jurisdiction exists, something
Japan has thus far refused to do.
August 2012 was a particularly bad month for Japan—and it
all had to do with the legacy of World War II (Spitzer 2012a). It
marked the sixty-seventh anniversary of the dropping of nuclear
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the surrender of Japan, and
the end of Japan’s brutal occupation of Korea and large parts of
China. South Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, insulted the
emperor, China and both Koreas protested the visit of some
Japanese cabinet members to the Yasakuni Shrine, and Chinese
protestors landed on the Diaoyu/Senkaku features. 
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Clearly the legacy of World War II is alive and bodes ill for
Northeast Asia. The unhealed psychological wounds of the past
run deep. As China has stated, Japan’s behavior “is a blatant
denial of the fruits of victory of the world’s anti-fascist war and a
severe challenge of post-war international order” (DiploNews
2012). China also accused Japan of “having an obsolete colonial
mentality” (Associated Press 2012a). Perhaps more important,
China sees Japan as continuing its history of arrogance and
aggression by being part of a US-led “China containment” strat-
egy. Raw nationalism has reared its ugly head in both countries
and is influencing leadership decisions on international and
domestic issues. The issues have even become a contest of
national identities (Rozman 2013). 
Disputes over small islands and ocean space are usually ancil-
lary at most to more fundamental geopolitical dialectics. How-
ever, in certain situations of great-power rivalry and competition
for scarce petroleum resources, such issues may become the tail
that wags the dog of international relations—particularly if fun-
damentals in the relationship are shaky. The intensifying competi-
tion between China and Japan for fisheries and gas resources in
the East China Sea has become just such a situation. Recent inci-
dents (between September 2012 and December 2013) are cer-
tainly not the first time territorial disputes have disrupted relations
between the two; it happened in 1996, 2005, and 2010. But they
are by far the worst. Moreover, because the islands are small,
unpopulated, and distant, the biggest danger may lie in the belief
on either side that a clash could be confined to a naval or air skir-
mish and not escalate to an attack on respective homelands (Walt
2013). The alleged Chinese locking-on of fire control radar on
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft is an indi-
cation of what may come next, perhaps “a threat of use of
force”—a violation of the UN Charter (Associated Press 2013;
Japan Times 2013c; Margolis 2013). China has declared the East
China Sea a “core interest,” meaning one it would go to war over,
and says that Japan is the party that has upset the status quo
(Asahi Shimbun 2013a). Tensions are rapidly increasing between
Beijing and Tokyo.
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Resource Potential
Much is at stake for the two powers in the East China Sea. To
begin with, the East China Sea could contain up to 160 billion
barrels of oil equivalent, including several trillion cubic feet of
gas. This sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential
resource areas located near large markets (Guo and Katakey
2012). But the development of oil and gas in much of the area
has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to bound-
aries and islets by China, Taiwan (Republic of China [ROC]),
and Japan. The Okinawa Trough may also contain significant
resources of metallic sulfides rich in copper, zinc, nickel, and
even gold and silver. The deepwater Xihu/Okinawa Trough is
also a potentially rich source of natural gas that could help meet
Chinese and Japanese domestic demand (“East China Seas,”
Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia).
China recently became the second-largest net oil importer in
the world and the world’s largest global energy consumer. Natural
gas imports have also risen in recent years, and China is now a net
importer of natural gas as well. Japan is the third-largest net
importer of crude oil behind the United States and China, as well
as the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). For
Japan and China, imports are projected to increase. Both are thus
keen on extracting hydrocarbon resources from the East China
Sea to help meet demand. 
Over the last decade, China has been drilling ever closer to
the equidistance line between undisputed territories of both
countries. Japan has unilaterally declared the equidistance line
as the boundary. China is now producing gas from the Chun-
xiao field situated just on its side of that line. Tokyo has offi-
cially protested the drilling because it fears China will siphon
off gas from its side of the boundary and continues to consider
allowing Teikoku Oil Company to drill on Japan’s side. Beijing
has fiercely protested even the possibility of such drilling by
Teikoku. These factors further complicate the geographical and
political jigsaw puzzle of overlapping claims in the East China
Sea. 
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Conflicting Claims 
The claims to the area are complicated and involve sovereignty
claims to territory, as well as claims both to continental shelves
and 200-nautical-mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
(Figure 1). China and Japan both claim sovereignty over the
Diaoyu Islands (the Senkakus in Japanese)—eight uninhabited
islets and rocks about 120 nm southwest of Okinawa. Japan con-
trols and administers the features, but both China and Taiwan have
formally incorporated them into their administrative systems.
China holds that the Diaoyu are small, uninhabited, and unin-
habitable features that cannot sustain an economic life of their
own, and thus, according to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)—which China, Japan, and South Korea
have ratified—they are not entitled to generate a continental shelf
or a 200-nm EEZ. Taiwan—which is not eligible to ratify the
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Figure 1  Conflicting Claims in the East China Sea
Source: Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Disputes: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions.”
Asian Perspective, vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 139.
treaty—also holds that the Diaoyu are not entitled to have a con-
tinental shelf or EEZ, and thus should have no significant effects
on boundary delimitation in the East China Sea. Japan, however,
argues that the features are legal islands; in other words, the
islands are inhabitable and can sustain an economic life of their
own and are thus entitled to have continental shelves and EEZs.
Moreover, Japan uses them as base points for its continental shelf
and EEZ claims toward China in the East China Sea.
Even if the conflicting sovereignty claims to the features did
not exist, China, Japan, and South Korea have overlapping claims
to continental shelves in the East China Sea. The parties cite dif-
ferent principles of international law to support their claims.
China uses the principle of natural prolongation of its land terri-
tory, arguing that the East China Sea continental shelf is the nat-
ural extension of the Chinese continental shelf and thus is under
the jurisdiction of China. Taiwan also uses the natural prolonga-
tion principle, as does South Korea—at least in the East China
Sea. China, Taiwan, and South Korea argue further that the Oki-
nawa Trough delineates the edge of the continental margin, and
thus the axis of the trough serves as the boundary between their
continental shelves and that of Japan. Japan, on the other hand,
argues that the trough is just an incidental depression in a contin-
uous continental margin between the two countries, and thus the
continental shelf boundary should be the line equidistant between
the undisputed territory of the two countries. 
China also argues that the delimitation should be effected by
agreement, and that agreement through consultation on the basis
of equity takes precedence over the equidistance line principle.
South Korea also insists that the presence of the Okinawa Trough
constitutes special circumstances under which the equidistance
line principle cannot be applied. 
All the claimants are also entitled to a 200-nm EEZ. Accord-
ing to UNCLOS, within its EEZ a country has sovereign rights
over the living and nonliving resources of the waters, the seabed,
and its subsoil. A country also has jurisdiction with regard to
marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of
the marine environment. The delineation of EEZ boundaries was
not an issue until February 1996, when Japan and South Korea
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almost simultaneously declared 200-nm EEZs. Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan all express their claim to a 200-nm EEZ in
conformity with the 1982 UNCLOS—that is, the outer limit of the
EEZ extends up to 200 nm from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. South Korea says that in
the areas where its EEZ overlaps with those of neighboring states,
the boundary will be delimited by agreement in conformity with
the relevant rules of international law. Since all the countries
except Taiwan are party to UNCLOS and the extent of the EEZ is
determined by distance, applying the treaty to an agreement on
boundaries should not present a problem. 
Nevertheless, several problems do exist. The different posi-
tions stem from different baselines, from different interpretations
of “entitlements,” and from the dispute over the ownership of fea-
tures from which the EEZ can be extended. Japan’s position is
that because it owns the group of islands called Danjo Gunto, it
is able to make claims to an EEZ extending from those islands to
the equidistance line between South Korea and Danjo Gunto.
South Korea does not dispute Japan’s ownership of Danjo Gunto,
but its position is that these are Japanese islands situated on South
Korea’s continental shelf and thus should be discounted in draw-
ing an EEZ boundary. Japan also uses the Diaoyu/Senkaku fea-
tures as a base for its EEZ claim, although it has so far not
specified its extent vis-à-vis China.
An additional complication is that the boundaries for the
EEZ and the continental shelf will not necessarily be the same.
The EEZ claim can be only up to 200 nm from baselines, while
a continental shelf claim can extend as far as 350 nm from base-
lines, depending on the morphology and geology of the conti-
nental margin.
Dispute over Island Ownership
The PRC and ROC claim that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have
been part of Chinese territory since at least 1534. But they
acknowledge that Japan gained control of the features in 1895
during the first Sino-Japanese War, through the Treaty of Shi-
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monoseki. Among the treaty’s demands was that China recognize
the autonomy of Korea (which had been part of China’s tributary
system) and relinquish some other territories to Japan. Those
included Taiwan (known then as Formosa) “together with all the
islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Taiwan,”
the Pescadores Islands (known as Penghu in Chinese), and the
Liaodong Peninsula (in southern Manchuria). Upon Japan’s defeat
in World War II, China and Taiwan assert that the Potsdam Dec-
laration, which Japan accepted as part of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, required that Japan relinquish control of all islands except
for “the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such
minor islands as shall be determined,” and they argue that this
means control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku features passed to China.
Japan does not accept that any ownership dispute exists,
asserting that the islands are an integral part of Japan (Lee 2012).
It repeated this position as recently as September 28, 2012, at the
UN General Assembly (Quinn and Eckert 2012). Japan has
rejected claims that the islands were under China’s control prior
to 1895, and that its sovereignty over these islands was affected
by the Potsdam Declaration or the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
Despite the complexity of relations between the PRC and
ROC, both governments agree that the features are part of Tai-
wan’s Toucheng Township in Yilan County. But Japan does not
recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, regarding the islands as a
part of Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture. 
The Japanese central government formally annexed the
islands on January 14, 1895, prior to the end of the first Sino-
Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki that concluded it.
Around 1900 a Japanese entrepreneur named Koga Tatsushiro
constructed a bonito (fish) processing plant on the islands with as
many as 200 workers. The business eventually failed in 1940, and
since that time the islands have been uninhabited. The islands
came under US government jurisdiction in 1945 with the end of
World War II. In 1969 the UN Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East identified potential oil and gas resources in the
East China Sea, increasing the value of the islands to all con-
cerned. In 1971 the Okinawa Reversion Treaty passed the US
Senate, transferring administration over the features to Japan the
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following year. The islands were owned and administered by
Japanese citizens on behalf of the Japanese government until
2012, when the Japanese government nationalized them. 
Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro led a campaign of nation-
alists to purchase the islands. But the central government stepped
in and preempted it by purchasing them itself. Japan’s government
argues that its moves were not intended to provoke China but
rather were an attempt to keep the features out of the hands of
nationalists like Ishihara, which it feared would purposely pro-
voke China. But Beijing has accused Japan of “stealing” its
“sacred territory” and upsetting the “status quo” (Connor 2012).
Prior to 2005, although the two countries regularly patrolled
the disputed area, no pattern of confrontations had developed. But
in September 2005 the dispute took a dangerous turn when five
Chinese naval vessels including a guided missile destroyer were
observed by Japan near the Chunxiao gas field. One of the war-
ships aimed its weapons at a Japanese P3-C surveillance aircraft,
which was monitoring the group. Then a day before bilateral talks
on sea boundaries were to resume, China confirmed that it had
established a “reserve vessel squadron” in the East China Sea that
was capable of “fighting during wars” (Valencia 2006).
For Japan, these moves—combined with the November 2004
detection of a Chinese nuclear submarine in Japanese territorial
waters, increased electronic surveillance by Chinese aircraft, and
the entry of some twenty-five Chinese exploration ships into
Japanese-claimed waters in the previous six months—meant that
China was becoming a potential threat. Indeed, in its “Security
and Guarding Plan,” the Japanese SDF for the first time identified
China as a threat, even discussing several threat scenarios, includ-
ing a brigade-size invasion of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by
China. Meanwhile, Taiwan raised its profile in the area by vowing
to send patrol vessels to protect its sovereignty over oil and gas
resources. 
From 2006, relations began to warm. The then new prime
minister, Abe Shinzo, made an icebreaking visit to Beijing, and
Premier Wen Jiabao returned the visit in April 2007. Abe’s suc-
cessor, Fukuda Yasuo, also visited China in December 2007, just
three months after taking office. In June 2008 the first port visit of
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a Japanese warship to China was announced (Dickie 2008). At
that time, Japan and China agreed in principle to joint develop-
ment of hydrocarbons in the East China Sea. The second quarter
of 2009 witnessed several high-level meetings between Japanese
and Chinese officials (Cossa and Glosserman 2009). Unfortu-
nately, issues of history resurfaced when then prime minister Aso
Taro visited the Yasakuni Shrine, and a movie on the Nanking
Massacre was released in China. After that, relations began to spi-
ral downward, particularly after Japan claimed that the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were under the protection of the US mil-
itary alliance. 
The Supposed Breakthrough
Joint Development
In April 2007 China’s national oil company (CNOOC) announced
that it had begun producing gas at the Tianwaitian field despite
Japan’s objections, and that it was ready to begin production from
the Chunxiao field (Lague 2012). Japan protested, spurring
renewed negotiations. On June 18, 2008, Japan and China agreed
to shelve their boundary dispute and jointly develop the resources
in specified areas of the East China Sea. 
Under the agreement, Japan and China were to jointly
develop China’s Longjiang (Asunaro) gas field and jointly
explore a 2,700-km² area straddling the median line south of the
Asunaro field. Moreover, Japanese companies would also invest
in China’s Chunxiao (Shirakaba) gas field and continue to dis-
cuss what to do with the Kashi (Tianwaitian) and Kusonoki
(Duanqiao) gas fields. Beijing also proposed cooperating on
development of gas fields near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but
Tokyo rejected the idea outright (Yoshida and Terada 2008).
The agreement was described as “provisional”—a transitional
step to protect each other’s legal position (Alabaster 2008). It
was said to be in keeping with UNCLOS, which holds that if no
immediate resolution of a boundary dispute is within reach, the
disputants should “enter into provisional arrangements of a prac-
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tical nature” without prejudice to the position of the countries
concerned or the final delimitation. 
To make progress, China had apparently made the remarkable
concession of agreeing to “joint development” of the Chunxiao
gas field, which lies four kilometers on the Chinese side of the
Japan-claimed median line boundary (Gupta 2008). In exchange
Japan supposedly agreed to include areas east of the median line
for joint development (Watts 2008). The two sides also agreed to
define the exact zones for joint development through further
negotiations and to share the profits in proportion to their respec-
tive investments.
What Went Wrong?
The agreement began to unravel almost before the ink was dry.
First, the Asunaro (Longjiang) gas field was dropped from the
agreement, as were China’s development plans, in deference to
South Korea because the strata containing natural gas straddle the
China–South Korea median line and extend into the Japan–South
Korea joint development zone (Guo Rongxing 2010). Also, in a
rare public protest, Chinese Internet users and Hong Kong media
sharply criticized the agreement and China’s leadership for
betraying the “national interest, humiliating the nation, and for-
feiting its sovereignty” (Shan 2008). A demonstration was held
outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing. It was monitored by
police but allowed to proceed. On June 19 Chinese vice foreign
minister Wu Dawei publicly defended the agreement, saying
China had not abandoned its sovereignty claim and that Beijing’s
position on the boundary—its claim extends to the edge of the
shelf, and it does not recognize Japan’s claim of a median line
boundary—had not changed (Zhong 2008). 
In another “first,” amid growing online anger, President Hu
Jintao visited a popular Internet chat room hosted by People’s
Daily for a twenty-minute dialogue. Subsequently it was
explained that China had only agreed to Japanese investment in
the Chunxiao (Shirakaba) field in accordance with Chinese laws,
and Japan’s investment was treated just like that of private com-
panies, not as part of a state-to-state codevelopment project (Lu
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2008). So this was not to be “joint development” in the classic
sense after all, and in investing, Japan would be recognizing
China’s sovereign rights to Chunxiao (Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China in Australia 2008).
On Japan’s part, then foreign minister Komura Masahiko
warned that long and tough negotiations were necessary before
joint exploration could start (International Herald Tribune 2008).
Nevertheless, Teikoku Oil—a subsidiary of Japan’s largest oil
exploration company, INPEX—and Nippon Oil Corporation
began planning exploration in the areas covered by the agreement
(Reuters 2008). Both had previously been awarded exploration
rights in the general area, but the Japanese government had
restrained them from conducting any activity there (Tan 2008).
In December 2008, despite a Japan-China prior notification
agreement (Valencia 2007), Chinese survey ships allegedly
entered Japanese-claimed 12-nautical-mile territorial waters unan-
nounced, near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Dalje.com 2008;
Japan Times 2008; Yuasa 2008). Japan protested, but China dis-
missed the objection, saying it owned the islets and had jurisdic-
tion over the waters in question.
In January 2009 Japan complained that China had violated the
spirit if not the letter of the East China Sea agreement by contin-
uing to develop the Tianwaitian (Kashi) field. Tokyo was con-
cerned that China’s production there would siphon off gas from its
side of the line (Agence France-Presse 2009). China admitted that
it had begun producing gas from the field but said that it was
within its sovereign rights to do so because the field lies west of
the Japanese-claimed median line boundary (Japan Times 2009a).
China’s foreign ministry added that the agreement or “principle
consensus” was that the two governments would discuss joint
development in “other parts of the East China Sea,” but not
including areas such as Tianwaitian within China’s undisputed
jurisdiction (Li 2009).
The two sides subsequently agreed to speed up implementa-
tion of the June 2008 agreement, but they failed to agree on
whether China could or should continue drilling in disputed areas
while negotiations were ongoing (Japan Times 2009b). In Febru-
ary, China expressed strong concern that Japan had permanently
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stationed a coast guard ship in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Japan
Times 2009c). This statement was followed in July by an assertion
by US senator Jim Webb that the United States recognized Japan’s
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China protested
vehemently (Japan Times 2009d).
In February 2009, tensions ratcheted up again when a Chinese
navy destroyer aimed its guns at a Japanese MSDF P3-C surveil-
lance plane near the Chunxiao gas field (Curtin 2005). Both sides
sent naval vessels to the area, but cooler heads prevailed. In
March, a summit meeting as well as a foreign ministers’ meeting
between the two countries came and went without progress on the
issues of ownership of the islands or interpretation and imple-
mentation of the joint development agreement (Mainichi Daily
News 2009).
Preparing for the Worst
While continuing to discuss the issues, both sides seem to be
preparing for the worst. Pressure has been building in Japan to
more strictly enforce its maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, Japan is
beginning to see China’s increasing naval presence and probes in
the East China Sea as a security threat. In 2007 Japan had passed
legislation permitting Japanese authorities to protect Japanese oil
production installations in the East China Sea in order to assuage
the concerns of their oil companies and workers if they were to
undertake drilling in the disputed waters. Nationalists were now
invoking this law. The situation was clearly trending in a negative
direction when a new crisis arose. 
On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided
with patrol boats of the Japan coast guard near the islands. The
trawler was detained, and the captain and crew were held in cus-
tody in Japan pending possible charges. A successful prosecution
of a Chinese citizen for alleged crimes committed on or near the
islands would create a new precedent, substantially changing the
status quo of the dispute and improving Japan’s legal position.
China demanded an immediate release of the Chinese fishermen.
When Japan refused, China responded with what was described at
the time as diplomatic shock and awe. The intensity of this reac-
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tion transformed thinking in Japan regarding China and the dis-
pute over the islands. Basically, it emboldened right-wing nation-
alists, who have put increasing pressure on the leadership
regarding this issue (Yunbi 2012). The incident disrupted official
and nonofficial exchanges and activities between the two coun-
tries. The crew was released on September 13, 2010, and the cap-
tain on September 24.
Tensions escalated again in August 2012 after Japan arrested
and deported fourteen people who sailed to Uotsuri Islet aboard a
ship from Hong Kong. Seven of them landed on the islet. As if to
retaliate, ten Japanese (including five local assembly members)
landed on the islet on August 19. Anti-Japan demonstrations broke
out in China. On August 28 the car of the Japanese ambassador to
China was attacked outside Beijing (Japan Times 2012b). Japan
recalled and then replaced its ambassador to China (Fackler
2012). Both countries then held several military exercises with
implications for the disputes (Associated Press 2012b; Japan
Times 2012f; Takenaka and Wee 2012). However, they also
engaged in working-level discussions of the problem (Reynolds
2012). Nevertheless, the situation began to heat up again in late
2012 when Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft entered Japan-
ese airspace over the Senkakus and Japan scrambled light Japan-
ese F-15 fighter jets to intercept them (McCurry 2012). 
The US Role
China holds the United States partly responsible for the situation,
of course, because it returned the islands to Japan rather than to
China at the end of World War II. Despite general public assur-
ances by senior US State Department officials over the years, it
is still not clear what the United States would do in a pinch under
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and
the United States. Some answer the question with another ques-
tion: “If Japan does not stand up, then the United States has no
reason to stand up.” Others push for a clarification of the policy.
“Will the U.S. support Japan militarily against any armed aggres-
sion over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands?” (White 2013).
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The United States is clearly worried that it may get drawn into
the fray. At their Sunnylands summit in 2013, President Barack
Obama urged Chinese President Xi Jinping to “deescalate” the
dispute and deal with Japan through diplomatic channels (Spetal-
nick 2013). In response to pressure from Japan, Washington has
publicly affirmed that the islands come under the scope of the US-
Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In other words,
the United States will assist Japan “if [as the treaty states] territo-
ries under its administration come under armed attack” (Harner
2012). The US Senate passed an amendment to the 2013 National
Defense Authorization Act that states, “While the United States
takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of
Japan over the Senkaku Islands. The unilateral actions of a third
party will not affect United States acknowledgment of the admin-
istration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands” (Johnston 2012).
China saw this as renewal of a “Cold War mentality” and
responded that it strongly opposed this US position (Xinhuanet
2012b).
China increasingly views the US-Japan alliance as part of a
larger US strategy to contain China (Perlez and Bradsher 2012).
Whether true or not, this interpretation of the alliance clearly
serves as a deterrent to China regarding the islands. However,
some say the balance of power is shifting and that the US deter-
rent is decreasing in effectiveness. This shift would increase the
risk of Chinese aggressiveness and of ensuing conflict (Gertz
2013). Complicating matters, the East China Sea could be the ori-
gin of the world’s first war started by drones (Keck 2013).
China’s defense ministry said, “If Japan does what it said and . . .
shoots down aircraft, this is ‘an act of war.’” Now Chinese and
Japanese coast guard vessels confront each other in the islands’
territorial seas on nearly a daily basis (Japan Times 2013d). The
tacit coexistence of both countries’ surveillance and enforcement
vessels in the territorial waters of the disputed features indirectly
indicates the Japanese government’s recognition of a dispute.
The US rebalancing of forces in Asia also clearly reaffirms
Japan’s continued dependence on the United States for its security
(Japan Times 2012d). Indeed, the United States and Japan have
revised their bilateral defense cooperation guidelines to deal with
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the island issue (Sonoda 2012). Japan’s particular contribution is
in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. As the dispute
heated up in September 2012 the United States signaled its intent
to serve as a regional “stabilizer” by sending two US Navy air-
craft carrier battle groups and a Marine Corps air-ground task
force cruising through the East China Sea and the South China
Sea (Spitzer 2012b). The George Washington strike group
includes destroyers, cruisers, and a fast attack submarine, as well
as up to ninety aircraft. Although they were on their way to under-
take exercises in the Andaman Sea, the message to all—including
China—was loud and clear.
Both the Japanese and Chinese governments are struggling to
exercise self-restraint over the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue. The United
States has publicly eschewed a mediating role, probably because
China does not consider a military ally of Japan as neutral. This
perception was apparent when China rejected the “nonattempt” of
a US delegation of former US national security officials to “medi-
ate” in 2012 (Xinhuanet 2012a). Then secretary of state Hillary
Clinton publicly opposed any escalation of tensions between the
two, and she also warned China against any unilateral action that
would undermine Japan’s administration of the islands (Japan
Times 2013b). Her successor, John Kerry, has repeated this posi-
tion (United Press International 2013). However, China and Japan
have secretly discussed the issues (Voice of America 2012). Lead-
ership in all three countries—the United States, China, and
Japan—is under considerable pressure from nationalists. This
makes the situation all the more dangerous because with the
growth of online influence in both China and Japan, strong
nationalist sentiment is becoming harder to manage. 
The following sequence of events shows the criticality and
depth of diplomatic efforts to maintain control of the situation.
China undertook exercises practicing the taking of a small island
at night (Space War 2012). The United States and Japan in turn
announced a drill to “retake” a small island occupied by enemy
troops (Japan Times 2012e; Yunbi 2012). This drill was abruptly
cancelled, but the main war games called “Keen Sword” pro-
ceeded as scheduled (Spitzer 2013). It was at about the same time
that the delegation of former US national security officials made
a visit to Tokyo and Beijing and warned that the issues could spin
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out of control (Walcott and Lakshmanan 2012). In short, nothing
was resolved, and Chinese surveillance ships began to enter
Japanese-claimed territorial waters around the islands, apparently
trying to provoke a Japanese response. Current prime minister
Abe Shinzo has said that Japan will use force if China tries to
land troops on the islands (Lindsay 2013).
An important strategic dimension to this imbroglio clearly
exists. If the Chinese were to control the islands, they could use
them to reap an intelligence bonanza in terms of surveillance of
Japanese and US forces on Okinawa and in the Sakashima
Islands, undermining their dominance in the Western Pacific
(Dupont 2013).
If this were not enough, the legal situation has become even
more complicated. Under UNCLOS, all the claimants have the right
to claim an extended continental shelf—in other words, a shelf
beyond 200 nm, the normal limits of the EEZ (United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea 1982). China, Japan, and South Korea
have all done so in general (Kim 2009; Manicom 2009; Watt 2012).
In December 2012 South Korea submitted its detailed official
extended-shelf claim in the East China Sea to the UN Continental
Shelf Commission (Yonhap News Agency 2012a; 2012b). The new
claims will overlap, and the claims of South Korea and China to the
entire continental shelf of the East China Sea all the way to the Oki-
nawa Trough will be “reinforced,” especially in northern portions of
the East China Sea. Moreover, the territorial dispute over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands still confounds any boundary settlement in
the southern East China Sea. Not surprisingly, Japan officially
opposed South Korea’s and China’s claims, thus preventing the
commission from evaluating them (Japan Times 2013a). It does not
help the general situation for all concerned, including the respective
publics, to realize that the required research to support the extended
continental shelf claims was undertaken in the disputed waters.
Taiwan’s Role
Taiwan plays a role in this issue as well, although it has been very
cautious to date. The ROC has the same fundamental claim to the
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features as China, and Taiwan also claims an EEZ and a conti-
nental shelf in the East China Sea. In fact, China’s claim to the
features is based on its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, and its
maritime claims would be greatly enhanced by its clear posses-
sion of Taiwan. Taiwan (as well as the PRC) has resorted to tak-
ing out full-page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post
broadcasting its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China has
asked Taiwan to make a joint sovereignty claim and offered to
extend protection to Taiwan’s civilian fishing boats around the
Diaoyu Islands. Taiwan has declined thus far. 
On July 4, 2012, a Taiwanese fishing boat carrying three
activists from the World Chinese Alliance in Defense of the
Diaoyu Islands was escorted near the islands by five coast guard
administration vessels from Taiwan. In late September, Taiwan
and Japanese coast guard ships exchanged water cannon fire.
China fully supported Taiwan’s actions (Enav 2012). The three
activists proclaimed that the islands belonged to China and raised
a PRC flag. The fact that the flag was not an ROC flag drew
praise from China and criticism from Taiwan. The Japanese coast
guard attempted to board the fishing vessel but was driven off by
Taiwan’s coast guard vessels, which were on the scene. One of
Taiwan’s vessels, which stayed several hours after the others had
left, bumped one of the Japanese vessels.
Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou has called on all parties to
refrain from aggression, to shelve their differences, to maintain
dialogue, to observe international law, and to resolve the dispute
by peaceful means. He has further suggested that all sides should
seek consensus on a code of conduct for the East China Sea and
establish a mechanism for jointly exploring and developing
resources in the region (Japan Times 2012c).  His proposal col-
lectively was called the East China Sea Peace Initiative, intended
to “bring peace and co-operation to this part of the world” (Tai-
wan Today 2013).
The recent Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement could be both a
stimulus and a complication. The agreement is a good example of
shelving a sovereignty debate and establishing a jointly managed
fishing area. However, by this agreement Taiwan implicitly rec-
ognizes Japan’s sovereignty over the islands because Japan main-
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tains its 12-nm territorial waters around the islands, which Taiwan
fishermen cannot enter. Moreover, Taiwan is supposed to prevent
Chinese fishing boats from entering the agreed area (Chan 2013).
The agreement also avoids areas covered by the 1997 China-Japan
fisheries agreement. So in China’s view, Japan has used Taiwan
and the agreement to bolster its sovereignty claim to the islands.
While clever, Japan’s move is transparent and has deeply angered
China (Blanchard 2013). Okinawa’s fishers are also very unhappy
with the deal.
The ADIZ Issue
On November 23, 2013, China sent an air patrol to back up its
newly declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the
East China Sea.1 Japan scrambled fighter jets in response. Accord-
ing to China’s announcement of the zone, any military aircraft
entering it would need to submit flight plans, maintain radio com-
munication, and reply promptly to identification inquiries from
Chinese authorities. China also said that its armed forces “will
adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do
not co-operate in the identification or refuse to follow the instruc-
tions” (BBC 2013). Further complicating the situation, China’s
zone partially overlaps the zones of Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea, and covers the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The tim-
ing and manner of China’s latest actions have undoubtedly com-
plicated an already dangerous situation.
Officials and analysts in Japan and the United States viewed
these actions as stretching the already taut rope of China-Japan
relations. Japan said that China’s new zone escalated the danger
of accidental “collisions” between the Chinese military and US
and Japanese counterparts, and lodged a “serious protest.” Secre-
tary of State Kerry issued a statement of concern, urging China
“not to implement its threat to take action against aircraft that do
not identify themselves or obey orders from Beijing” (Asahi
Shimbun 2013b). US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel was more
blunt. He said the imposition of the zone was a “destabilizing
attempt to alter the status quo in the region” (American Forces
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Press Service 2013). Hagel reminded Beijing that the disputed
islands are covered by the US-Japan security treaty and that, in
the event of an attack, the United States is committed to fighting
alongside Japan against a “common danger.” Japan indicated that
aircraft from its SDF would ignore Beijing’s orders to obtain its
permission before entering. Hagel also said it would not change
how the United States conducts military operations in the region.
Backing up this statement, two B-52 bombers out of Guam flew
into China’s new zone without “filing flight plans, radioing
ahead, or registering our frequencies,” apparently trying to
ensure that the Chinese version of the zone does not add to cus-
tomary law (Valencia 2013a). China said that it had monitored
the aircraft—but did nothing else. This move seemed to contra-
dict the US position that China and Japan should resolve the
issue by diplomatic means. But it may have helped mitigate
Japan’s urge to immediately increase its deployment of ships and
planes to the area.
Obviously, the situation is fraught with brinkmanship and the
potential for confrontation—unless cooler heads prevail. From
China’s perspective, by declaring the ADIZ, it was simply level-
ing the playing field. China does have the right by international
precedent and practice to declare an air defense identification
zone to protect its sovereignty over territory and the maritime
areas it claims. Moreover, China said the zone rules would not
affect normal commercial air traffic, implying that it applies to
military aircraft only. This aspect needs clarification, for major
international commercial carriers have already begun to file flight
plans. Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, claimed the zone
“could contribute to regional peace and security by curbing the
increasing rampancy of Japan’s right-wing forces” (Valencia
2013a). Indeed, in China’s view, an increasingly nationalistic and
aggressive Japan has altered the “status quo” by “nationalizing”
the disputed islands. In this context, China’s declaration was prob-
ably in part a reaction to Japan’s “threat” to shoot down China’s
drones flying over the disputed area.
ADIZs are not new and have always been unilateral and con-
troversial. More than twenty countries have declared such zones.
According to the Chinese media, Japan’s ADIZ was created by the
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United States and transferred to the Japanese for management in
1969. They said Japan has since unilaterally expanded the zone
twice, in 1972 and 2010, and Japan’s zone is not recognized by
China or Russia. The United States has five ADIZs around North
America, including a large one off Alaska and the Aleutian Islands
that extends several hundred kilometers out to sea. In this zone,
foreign civilian and military aircraft are monitored and interro-
gated. The US zone is jointly administered by civilian air traffic
control authorities and the North American Aerospace Defense
Command. The United States requires any aircraft entering the
zone to radio its planned course and destination. Any aircraft in
this zone without authorization may be treated as a threat, poten-
tially leading to interception by fighter aircraft.
Although Kerry said the United States does not recognize
the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to for-
eign aircraft not intending to enter national air space, in prac-
tice the United States does so itself.  For example, the United
States routinely scrambles jet fighters to intercept Russian
bombers in its zone, regardless of destination.  In the latter part
of 2013 alone, US jets  intercepted Russian Bear bombers in the
Alaska zone at least five times. In theory, overlapping zones are
not unusual and can be managed cooperatively, as is the case
with the United States and Canada. However, in the East China
Sea they involve airspace over islands and maritime space dis-
puted by two antagonists, and thus the potential for conflict is
high.
Hopefully all sides will exercise restraint and seek to negoti-
ate a resolution, perhaps with some voluntary guidelines for con-
duct of military aircraft in the areas of overlapping zones.
Although Russia does not recognize Japan’s ADIZ, Japan and
Russia have a regular consultative process “to monitor military
interactions and prevent risky behaviors” around the disputed
Northern Territories/southern Kuril Islands, so perhaps there is a
model here (Valencia 2013a). Presently there are no formally
agreed-upon rules regarding ADIZs or conduct within them. Per-
haps a UN-sponsored conference could help formulate an interna-
tional agreement addressing these issues. 
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Ways Forward
Determining “Joint Development”
Fortunately, some factors at work could help ameliorate the dis-
pute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The realiza-
tion that a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too
important to be thwarted by these disputes may be the catalyst
necessary for wise leaders to forge at least a temporary solution.
And despite chilly diplomatic relations, Japanese-Chinese trade
and investment had been increasing every year. Finally, pressure
is growing in China and Japan to proceed with development of oil
and gas in the area, therefore increasing motivation to reach a
compromise that would allow them to do so—individually or
together.
Although both governments seem to agree in principle on
joint development, part of the problem is that they have different
interpretations of what “joint development” means or implies, and
what area(s) should be jointly developed. Japan believes it means
that China must cease its current exploration and development in
Japanese-claimed areas and that China should share the gas on
China’s side of the Japanese-claimed equidistance line. But China
thinks that “joint development” means that Japan will not inter-
fere with Chinese exploitation of fields on its side of the line and
that the area for joint development is between the median line
claim and China’s claimed continental shelf boundary, including
the area around the disputed islets.
Focusing on the specifics of the dispute, three basic agree-
ments in principle are necessary before details of any solution can
be negotiated.
First, Japan needs to at least acknowledge that a territorial
dispute exists over the features (ANINews 2012) and to agree that
the disputed territory (the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands) cannot be
used as a basis for EEZ or continental shelf claims (Van Dyke
2013). Assuming that Japan claims an EEZ and continental shelf
from the islands, this concession by Japan could be compensated
in a joint development scheme (see below). If the two parties can-
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not agree on this point, the sovereignty issue will impede the
boundary negotiations indefinitely. If they can agree, then the sov-
ereignty issue can be separated from the boundary issue.
The second agreement necessary to negotiate a solution con-
cerns a unified boundary for both the EEZ and the continental
shelf. Given China’s claim of a continental shelf here, this would
be a major concession on China’s part, which could be compen-
sated by the location of the boundary or the percentage of alloca-
tions in the joint development scheme. Having two boundaries
would be politically messy and impractical, as well as a constant
source of irritation and provocation as bilateral relations wax and
wane. However, if the two parties insist on two separate bound-
aries, then it should be agreed that they be negotiated separately
without linkage, because the principles, criteria, and degree of dif-
ficulty are different.
The third agreement necessary is that regardless of where the
boundary is located, joint development of fish, minerals, and
hydrocarbon resources will be undertaken. This point has essen-
tially already been agreed to in principle—and is in practice for
fisheries. It would assure both parties that they would retain a
share of the resources, known and unknown. It would also help to
solidify the relationship because of the common goal of develop-
ing the resources.
If these three basic agreements can be reached, myriad possi-
bilities open up. Variables that can be negotiated include the loca-
tion of the boundary, the areas of joint development, and the split
of the resources and responsibilities (with the latter perhaps vary-
ing with location). If the details of the joint development agree-
ment and the boundary location are considered as a package, there
will be more to balance and trade off.
In all options, the first step would be to agree to a 12-nm terri-
torial sea enclave around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets and to leave
that area either as a “no-go” zone or for joint use and future settle-
ment. These options also assume that China’s claim to the Japan/
South Korea joint development zone (JDZ) will be quietly dropped
as part of this settlement and that the tiny overlap between China
and South Korea due to China’s use of the Dandong feature as a
base point will also be separated and quietly resolved. 
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Figure 2 offers an example of how to manipulate the parame-
ters of joint development to satisfy the PRC and Japan. The region
could be divided at approximately latitude 27° north into North
and South Zones. The equidistance principle could be applied in
the North Zone. Although the existence of the Japan-ROK JDZ
might complicate matters, the boundary could initially run along
the JDZ’s southwestern edge, which is approximately equidistant
between China and South Korea. In the South Zone, the boundary
could be the equidistance line, ignoring the Diaoyu/Senkaku fea-
tures, or perhaps that line adjusted by the length of the coastline
ratio of 64:36 (the mainland and Taiwan) versus Japan (the
Ryukyus). Alternatively, the adjusted equidistance line ignoring
the features could be the boundary in both the North and South
Zones. These lines could then be connected to the axis of the Oki-
nawa Trough to define the southern portion of the boundary. 
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Figure 2  Possible Joint Development Arrangements
If the unified boundary is the equidistance line ignoring the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the resources in the area between the
EEZ boundary originally claimed by Japan from the islands and
the equidistance line could be allocated to China. Those situated
between the equidistance line and a line halfway to the Okinawa
Trough could be shared equally, and those between the line
halfway to the trough and the trough itself could be split 25/75 in
favor of Japan.
If the boundary is located two-thirds of the way to the
trough—because of China’s greater length of coastline on the East
China Sea (a common consideration in precedents)—the joint
development split could be Japan’s original EEZ claim from the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to the median line—75/25 for China, and
from the median line to the boundary—a 50/50 split. All resources
to the east of the boundary would be allocated to Japan.
Getting from Here to There
In this conflict between China (including Taiwan) and Japan, a
first step toward a solution would be for Japan and China to tac-
itly agree on an equidistance line that ignores the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands as a “working” boundary. Taiwan and any remaining for-
eign concession holders could perhaps be persuaded by induce-
ments from Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing to abandon any
remaining offshore concessions on Japan’s side of the equidis-
tance line. Under this working agreement, Taipei would not repeat
its claims to the seabed beyond the equidistance line based on its
claim to jurisdiction over the China mainland. Beijing and Taipei
might then cooperate in the development of the resources on Bei-
jing’s side of the equidistance line. Indeed, China’s national oil
company, CNOOC, and Taiwan’s national oil company, CPC
Corporation, are discussing jointly exploring the northern Taiwan
Strait (Fox Business 2012).
The United States could help effectuate this scenario by mak-
ing clear that its recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate
government of China carries with it recognition of the PRC as the
sole representative of the Chinese continental shelf and EEZ
claims. This would encourage Japan to do likewise, and could
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incidentally help improve Sino-Japanese relations. At the very
least, the US government and US companies should tacitly
encourage China and Japan to explore such an agreement.
Ensuing Sino-Japanese negotiations could focus on a compre-
hensive agreement. The countries could enter into negotiations for
the continental shelf and EEZ boundary making in good faith, and
during that time conduct joint exploration to determine the size of
any hydrocarbon resources in an agreed-upon area, perhaps the
area of original overlapping claims. This was the modus operandi
in the South China Sea involving China, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam. When the time is right, a full-scale joint development pro-
gram could be launched in part or all of the area.
In the Meantime
Given that swift resolution of these disputes is unlikely, the most
pressing immediate task is to find effective mechanisms to man-
age them and prevent any escalation of incidents. The key prob-
lem lies not so much with governments as with nationalist
political constituencies within each state and the pressures that
they can bring to bear. In the short and medium term, it is there-
fore critically important that the governments involved take seri-
ously the fact that governments of other claimant states are also
constrained by domestic political considerations. There has been a
marked failure to do so in the past.
Second, while democratic governments may feel unable or be
unwilling to prevent citizens from embarking on legal but
provocative actions like the 1996 erection of a lighthouse on the
Senkakus by Japanese nationalists, they can and should refrain
from conferring official status on such actions. Moreover, if gov-
ernments disapprove of such actions, the governments should
have the courage to say so publicly. If this stance is perceived to
be too politically difficult, governments should at least ensure that
their disapproval is communicated to the government of the rival
claimant state.
Third, greater emphasis needs to be placed on preventive
diplomacy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation
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in the Asia Pacific have taken up this point, but so far with little
practical policy impact. Moreover, none of the claimant states
has indicated any interest in taking the East China Sea disputes
to formal legal adjudication (Japan Times 2012a). However, it
might still be possible via the offices of the ARF chairperson to
create an “eminent persons group.” Such a group should prefer-
ably undertake its task of preventive diplomacy during a spell of
relative calm. The task would not be to seek resolution but
rather to consider ways of managing the dispute nonviolently
and preventing, or at least controlling, escalation should there be
more flare-ups.
Urgently needed for conflict avoidance is bilateral agreement
on guidelines for the regime of military vessels in disputed EEZs.
Such an agreement might in turn lead to a “Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the East China Sea” similar to but more
robust than that reached by the multiple claimants (China most
prominently) to the South China Sea. This declaration would pro-
vide more predictability regarding the activities of the other mar-
itime vessels and aircraft, reducing suspicions and preventing
surprises.
Fifth, if the creation of an eminent persons group is consid-
ered premature, Track II meetings involving scholars, think tank
analysts, and officials acting in their private capacity could be set
up to investigate a range of confidence-building measures
(CBMs). CBMs would be designed to foster conflict management
and prevent conflict escalation rather than seek a long-term solu-
tion. The Canadian-sponsored, Indonesian-hosted Track II effort,
the South China Sea Working Group—which involves China and
Taiwan and which deliberately avoided engaging in discussions
on sovereignty issues and boundaries—provides a possible prece-
dent. Here, the focus was on building confidence among claimant
states by encouraging maritime cooperation between them in non-
controversial areas such as marine scientific research; environ-
mental protection, including biodiversity and fisheries assessment
and management; and mineral resource assessment. The focus
was on what is achievable at the time. Although these were for-
mally Track II meetings, officials from the claimant states took
part under the polite fiction that they were acting in their “private
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capacities.” In the South China Sea, this Track II cooperation
eventually provided the basis for formal official cooperation.
Conclusion
A Balance Sheet of Positives and Negatives
Obviously, the tone and tenor of China-Japan and China-Taiwan
relations will affect the possibility of a solution. If China-Japan
relations deteriorate further, the issue may well become a flash
point. The following analysis assumes that these relations remain
stable.
Specific positive and negative factors are at work in China’s
and Japan’s interactions over the East China Sea and its features.
Positive factors include the claimants’ ratification of the 1982
UNCLOS; China–South Korean rapprochement and discussion of
joint development in the Yellow Sea; China-Taiwan discussions
on jointly developing any hydrocarbons in their portion of the
East China Sea; agreement in principle between China and Japan
to joint development, precedents, and experiences with joint
arrangements—China with the Philippines and Vietnam in the
South China Sea and Japan with South Korea in the northern East
China Sea—and previous compromises between China and Japan
regarding fisheries and marine scientific research in the disputed
area.
The two countries have developed CBMs, including the
Japan-China Maritime Communications Mechanism, the Maritime
Search and Rescue Co-operation Agreement, and the High-Level
Consultation on Maritime Affairs. But none of these agreements
has been signed or implemented (Przstup, Bradford, and Manicom
2013). Some evidence of dispute management efforts also exists,
at least at the operational level. Chinese and Japanese coast guard
vessels both appear to be operating under tacit rules of engage-
ment. Neither side has attempted to expel the other’s vessels from
the territorial sea.
These positives have to be weighed against negative factors.
Such factors include Japan’s agreement with the United States to
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help in the defense of Taiwan against China, China’s increasingly
frequent and agressive presence in Japan’s claimed sea and air
space, Japan’s declared perception of China as a threat, South
Korean and Japanese declarations of EEZs that encompass areas
claimed by China, Japan’s use of the Senkakus as a basepoint for
its EEZ claim, China’s specific reaffirmation of its sovereignty
over the Diaoyu Islands in its 1992 Territorial Sea Law, China’s
drawing of baselines enclosing the features, the supportive
domestic public reactions to the exploits of nationalists on both
sides, and the apparent unwillingness of one or both to resolve the
issue. Perhaps the biggest negative is that Chinese generally
detest Japanese, a shocking statement in and of itself (Glosserman
2012; Greenfield 2012); almost any cooperative proposal and cer-
tainly any assertive action by Japan on this issue is seen in China
as a source of national humiliation, making it almost impossible
for China’s leaders to compromise. 
Tension can flare up at any moment. In November 2013 Bei-
jing’s military accused Tokyo of a “highly dangerous provocation
by interfering with Chinese navy live-fire drills (Agence France-
Presse 2013). Further complicating the situation is China’s new
ADIZ, which overlaps with those claimed and utilized by Japan
and South Korea.
The Sino-Japanese maritime conflict has two fundamental
dimensions: the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands and the delimitation of a boundary for the vast EEZ and
continental shelf of the East China Sea. Many commentators have
considered the issues inseparable. They view settlement of the
first as a necessary condition for the second. However, this view
is outdated. Recent legal developments, international adjudica-
tions, state practice, and the ratification of UNCLOS by the
claimants point to the possibility of separating the two issues.
Islands of similar location, economic utility, and legal status to
those of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have invariably been ignored
in seabed boundary delimitations between opposing states, sug-
gesting that regardless of their ultimate owner, the features should
only have a maximum of 12-nm territorial sea around them.
Legally, they will not have their own continental shelf or EEZ. 
The implication of this conclusion for the Sino-Japanese mar-
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itime conflict is that the territorial and jurisdictional issues are
separable and that the latter may be dealt with before the former
is finally resolved. Agreement on the irrelevance of the Diaoyu/
Senkaku territorial dispute to, and detaching it from the Sino-
Japanese jurisdictional controversy would therefore be a major
milestone on the path toward a solution. If such an agreement
were reached, it would indicate that a boundary ignoring these
features can indeed be negotiated.
Domestic nationalist politics is a prime factor in these dis-
putes. But nationalist politics seems to run in cycles of intensity.
When the cycles in the respective nations reach their next com-
mon nadirs, wise and courageous leaders should seize the oppor-
tunity to hammer out a preventative modus operandi to manage
these conflicts. The alternative is continued mutual suspicion,
unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an
increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling national-
ist sentiments and political conflict.
A Declaration of Conduct in the East China Sea
Although reverberations continue, Japan and China have gone to
the political brink over the East China Sea several times and
wisely stepped back. However, if the past has anything to say
about the future, serious confrontations at sea will continue, dis-
turbing not only relations between the disputants but also the
security regime in Northeast Asia. This instability is not accept-
able—not only for the parties directly concerned, but also for their
neighbors and extraregional partners as well. 
What is most needed now is an agreed Declaration on Con-
duct in the East China Sea. The foundation and intent for one
already exist. In February 2007 the six parties to the talks regard-
ing peace on the Korean peninsula agreed to negotiate a regional
security mechanism in an appropriate separate forum. More to the
point, all Northeast Asian states except North Korea have ratified
UNCLOS. The convention provides a general framework and
some specific confidence- and security-building measures. For
example, some agreements in the region already implement the
convention’s stipulation that, pending agreement on EEZ and con-
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tinental shelf boundaries, the parties concerned shall enter into
“provisional arrangements of a practical nature” for management
of resources in areas of overlapping claims. Such provisional
arrangements in Northeast Asia include agreements between
China and Japan, China and South Korea, and Japan and South
Korea to share fish stocks in defined portions of their respective
disputed areas. More significant, Japan and South Korea have
been undertaking joint development of hydrocarbons for nearly
forty years in their area of overlapping continental shelf claims in
the northern East China Sea. Even more remarkable, in December
2005 North Korea and China forged a similar arrangement in
West Korea Bay, and Japan and China have at least agreed in prin-
ciple to do the same in the central East China Sea. Moreover, after
several serious incidents, Japan and China established a mutual
“prior notification” regime for scientific research in their disputed
area in the East China Sea. 
Given this network of conflict avoidance arrangements, an
agreed declaration of expected conduct would be a logical next
step. But what should such a code contain? We have witnessed the
need for a clause addressing the question of arrest and detention
of fishing vessels and crew of fellow claimants. A declaration of
conduct should also govern any and all other activities in disputed
areas, such as resource exploration and exploitation, marine sci-
entific research, marine and aerial “spy probes,” and other
provocative military activities in disputed EEZs.
Right up front must be a clause stating that nothing in the
declaration prejudices any party’s sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
its claimed territory, territorial sea, continental shelf, or EEZ, or its
rights and responsibilities under UNCLOS. It should reaffirm the
use of the sea only for peaceful purposes and the resolution of dis-
putes without the threat or use of force in accordance with interna-
tional law, including UNCLOS. It should also reaffirm the freedom
of navigation and overflight consonant with international law. The
parties would commit to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of
activities that might complicate or escalate disputes, including
refraining from occupying presently uninhabited features. They
would also agree to negotiate provisional arrangements of a practi-
cal nature to manage and share the resources and activities in dis-
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puted areas, as well as agree to notify each other of any pending
activities, such as military exercises in waters of interest to other
parties. Outside parties would be encouraged to adhere to the pro-
visions of the declaration. Looking forward, the parties would agree
to consider making the declaration a formal code of conduct.
While all this may appear to be wishful thinking, China
agreed to a similar ASEAN declaration forged in 2002 for the
South China Sea, which came about only after years of con-
frontation and actual violent conflict over maritime issues. The
geopolitical conditions in the two regions are significantly differ-
ent. However, a consensus is evolving that it is not too early to
begin discussing security architecture in Northeast Asia. That dis-
cussion should begin at sea.
Notes
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for
South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China. His work embraces maritime
policy analysis in Asia. He is the author of numerous studies of maritime
issues in Asia, including The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves
in Asia (Routledge, 2005). He can be reached at mjvalencia @hawaii.rr.com.
Parts of this article have been extracted and updated from Mark J.
Valencia, “The East China Sea Disputes: Context, Claims, Issues, and Pos-
sible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 127–
167. 
1. This section on the ADIZ is adapted from Valencia 2013b.
References
Agence France-Presse. 2009. “China Violates Accord with Japan over Dis-
puted Gas Field: Report.” January 4.
———. 2013. “China Accuses Japan of ‘Dangerous Provocation’ at Sea.”
November 1, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net.
Alabaster, Jay. 2008. “Japan, China Reach Deal on Undersea Gas Explo-
ration.” USA Today, June 18, www.usatoday.com.
American Forces Press Service. 2013. “Hagel Issues Statement on East
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.” November 23. www
.defense.gov.
ANINews. 2012. “Japan May ‘Acknowledge’ China’s Claim to Disputed
Senkaku Islands to Calm Tension.” October 10.
Mark J. Valencia 213
Asahi Shimbun. 2013a. “Japanese, Chinese Defense Officials Meet to Ease
Tensions over Senkakus.” April 27, http://ajw.asahi.com.
———. 2013b. “China’s New Air Defense Zone Raises U.S. Concerns.”
November 24, http://ajw.asahi.com.
Associated Press. 2012a. “China Takes Aim at Japan over Island Dispute.”
September 27, www.cbsnews.com.
———. 2012b. “Flexing Maritime Muscle, China Holds Naval Exercise
amid Island Dispute with Japan.” October 19, www.foxnews.com.
———. 2013. “US Believes Japan’s Account of China’s Radar-Locking in
the East China Sea.” Times Colonist, February 12, www.times
colonist.com.
BBC. 2013. “US B-52 Bombers Challenge Disputed China Air Zone.”
November 26, www.bbc.co.uk.
Blanchard, Ben. 2013. “China Angered as Japan, Taiwan Sign Fishing
Agreement.” Reuters, April 10, www.reuters.com.
Chan, Minnie. 2013. “Taiwan Would ‘Expel’ Mainland Trawlers Under
Japan Fishing Deal.” South China Morning Post, April 10, www
.scmp.com.
Connor, Richard. 2012. “Japan Insists ‘No Compromise’ on East China Sea
Islands.” Deutsche Welt, September 27, www.dw.de.
Cossa, Ralph A., and Brad Glosserman. 2009. “Old Challenges, New
Approaches.” Comparative Connections, vol. 11, no. 2 (April–June),
pp. 1–16.
Curtin, J. Sean. 2005. “Sea of Confrontation: Japan-China Territorial and Gas
Dispute Intensifies.” Japan Focus, October 19, http://japanfocus.org.
Dalje.com. 2008. “China Dismisses Japan Protest over Ship Incident.”
December 9, http://dalje.com.
Dickie, Mure. 2008. “China to Host Japanese Warship.” Financial Times,
June 3, www.ft.com.
DiploNews. 2012. “Japan Must Make a Strategic Choice, Says China.” Octo-
ber 8, www.diplonews.com.
Dupont, Alan. 2013. “High-Stakes Tension on the China Seas.” The Aus-
tralian, March 12, www.theaustralian.com.au.
East China Sea. 2014. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org (accessed January
3).
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia. 2008. “Vice FM:
Chunxiao Oil Field’s Sovereign Rights Belong to China.” June 20,
http://au.china-embassy.org/eng.
Enav, Peter. 2012. “Japan, China Move to Dampen Island Dispute.” Associ-
ated Press, September 26, http://news.yahoo.com.
Fackler, Martin. 2012. “Under Diplomatic Strain, Japan Recalls Envoy in
Dispute with China over Islands.” New York Times, July 15, www
.nytimes.com.
Fox Business. 2012. “CNOOC Group, Taiwan’s CPC Plan Joint Deep Water
Exploration Pact—Sources.” Fox Business, October 26, http://m
.foxbusiness.com.
Gertz, Bill. 2013. “Inside the Ring: Danger of China Conflict Grows.”
Washington Times, November 13, www.washingtontimes.com.
214 The East China Sea Disputes
Glosserman, Brad. 2012. “A Problem Bigger than the Senkaku.” Pacnet, no.
62A, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 9, http://
csis.org.
Greenfield, Liah. 2012. “The Roots of Chinese/Japanese Rivalry.” Project
Syndicate, September 24, www.project-syndicate.org.
Guo Aibing and Rakteem Katakey. 2012. “Disputed Islands with 45 Years of
Oil Split China, Japan.” Bloomberg News, October 11, www.bloomberg
.com.
Guo Rongxing. 2010. “Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploita-
tion: Some Options for the East China Sea.” Brookings Institution, Cen-
ter for Northeast Asian Policy Studies Visiting Fellow Working Paper,
September. 
Gupta, Sourabh. 2008. “An Outbreak of ‘Warm Spring’: The Hu-Fukuda
Summit Assessed.” NAPSNet Policy Forum, 08-041, May 22, http://
nautilus.org.
Harner, Stephen. 2012. “Is the U.S. Committed to Defend the Senkakus?
Text of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty.” Forbes, September 23,
www.forbes.com.
International Herald Tribune. 2008. “Japan, China Reach Agreement on
Undersea, Gas Exploration in East China Sea.” International Herald
Tribune, June 18.
Japan Times. 2008. “Chinese Intrude at Senkakus.” Japan Times, December
9.
———. 2009a. “China Rebuffs Protests over Gas Field Activity.” Japan
Times, January 5. 
———. 2009b. “Joint Gas Deal to Speed Up, but China to Continue Exploit-
ing Disputed Areas.” Japan Times, January 10. 
———. 2009c. “U.S. Reassures Japan that Defense Pact Extends to Senkaku
Islands.” Japan Times, March 2. 
———. 2009d. “Beijing Reasserts Claim to Senkakus.” Japan Times, July
20.
———. 2012a. “Tokyo Says It May Take Isle Dispute to the International
Court of Justice.” Japan Times, August 12.
———. 2012b. “Nationalism over the Senkakus.” Japan Times, August 25. 
———. 2012c. “Ma Urges Talks to Calm Senkaku Tiff.” Japan Times, Octo-
ber 12. 
———. 2012d. “U.S. Security Ties Serve as Senkaku Deterrent: Ambassa-
dor.” Japan Times, October 13.
———. 2012e. “Japan, U.S. Abandon Drill to ‘Retake’ Isle.” Japan Times,
October 15.
———. 2012f. “Chinese Intruders Tell Coast Guard to Get Out.” Japan
Times, October 31.
———. 2013a. “Tokyo Sinks Seoul’s Bold U.N. Continental Shelf Bid.”
Japan Times, January 12.
———. 2013b. “Clinton Urges Dialogue, Calm over Senkaku Row.” Japan
Times, January 20.
———. 2013c. “Chinese Officials Admit to MSDF Radar Lock Allegations.”
Japan Times, March 18.
Mark J. Valencia 215
———. 2013d. “China Coast Guard Ships Confront Japanese Cutters.”
Japan Times, July 26.
Johnston, Eric. 2012. “U.S. Senate Passes Senkaku Backing.” Japan Times,
December 1, www.japantimes.co.jp.
Keck, Zachary. 2013. “China’s Air-Sea Battle Plan for the South China Sea.”
The Diplomat, November 13, http://thediplomat.com.
Kim Sue-young. 2009. “S. Korea Files Claim to Seabed Between China and
Japan.” Korea Times, May 12. 
Lague, David. 2012. “Analysis: China’s Nine-Dashed Line in South China
Sea.” Reuters, May 25, www.reuters.com.
Lee, Mathew. 2012. “Clinton Presses China on Maritime Spats.” Associated
Press: The Big Story, September 27, http://bigstory.ap.org.
Li Xiaokun. 2009. “Japan Asked Not to Twist Accord of Oil Exploration.”
China Daily, January 7, www.chinadaily.com.cn.
Lindsay, James. 2013. “What Should Washington Do About Rising Tensions
in the East China Sea?” Council on Foreign Relations: The Water’s
Edge, April 23, http://blogs.cfr.org.
Lu, An. 2008. “Q&A: Chinese FM on East China Sea Issue.” China View,
June 24, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
Mainichi Daily News. 2009. “Progress Made at Beijing FM Conference, but
Still a Long Way to Go.” Mainichi Daily News, March 2.
Manicom, James. 2009. “China’s Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf
in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implications.” China Brief, vol. 9,
no. 14 (July), www.jamestown.org.
Margolis, Eric S. 2013. “Close Call in East China Sea.” Sun Daily, February
11.
McCurry, Justin. 2012. “Senkaku Islands Dispute: US Faces Delicate Diplo-
matic Task.” Alaska Dispatch, December 16, www.alaskadispatch
.com.
Perlez, Jane, and Keith Bradsher. 2012. “Former Chinese Diplomat Says
U.S. Is Using Japan to Make Gains in Asia.” New York Times, October
30, www.nytimes.com.
Przstup, James, John Bradford, and James Manicom. 2013. “Japan-China
Maritime Confidence Building and Communication Mechanisms.” Pac-
net, no. 67, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 20,
http://csis.org.
Quinn, Andrew, and Paul Eckert. 2012. “U.S. Call for Cool Heads in China-
Japan Island Dispute Goes Unheeded.” Reuters, September 28, www
.reuters.com. 
Reuters. 2008. “Japan’s Teikoku, Nippon Oil Eye Gas Project—Nikkei.”
Reuters, June 21, www.reuters.com.
Reynolds, Isabel. 2012. “China Holds Working-Level Discussions with
Japan on Islands Spat.” Bloomberg News, November 4.
Rozman, Gilbert. 2013. “The Sino-Japanese Clash: What Is Behind It?” For-
eign Policy Research Institute, May, www.fpri.org.
Shan, Zhou. 2008. “China and Japan Agree on Joint Gas Exploration in East
China Sea.” Epoch Times, June 27.
216 The East China Sea Disputes
Sonoda, Koji. 2012. “Japan, U.S. Agree to Look at Revising Defense Pact.”
Asia & Japan Watch, November 11, http://ajw.asahi.com.
Space War. 2012. “China to Conduct Naval Exercises in East China Sea.”
October 18, www.spacewar.com.
Spetalnick, Matt. 2013. “Obama Urges De-escalation, Dialogue in China-
Japan Maritime Row.” Reuters, June 8, www.reuters.com.
Spitzer, Kirk. 2012a. “War’s Legacy Plagues Japan and Its Neighbors.”
Kirkspitzer.com, August 16
———. 2012b. “Big U.S. Fleet Nears Disputed Islands, But What For?”
Time, September 30, http://nation.time.com.
———. 2013. “Stealth Fleet Sails the East China Sea.” Kirkspitzer.com,
November 21.
Taiwan Today. 2013. “Ma Promotes East China Sea Peace Initiative.”
August 5. 
Takenaka, Kiyoshi, and Sui-Lee Wee. 2012. “U.S., Japan to Hold Joint Mil-
itary Drill amid Island Row with China.” Reuters, October 30.
Tan, Hwee Hwee. 2008. “Japanese Explorers Hopeful After East China Sea
Pact.” Energy Current, June 26.
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea. 1982. Article 76, Paragraph
8.
United Press International. 2013. “Kerry Spells Out Policy on Senkaku
Islands.” April 15.
Valencia, Mark J. 2006. “The East China Sea Dispute: Ways Forward.” Papers
on Historical Reconciliation and Cooperative Security, November 30,
http://reconciliation-papers.blogspot.kr.
———. 2007. “The East China Sea Disputes: Context, Claims, Issues, and
Possible Solutions.” Asian Perspective, vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 127–
167.
———. 2013a. “ADIZ Issues Need Cooperative Management.” Global
Times, November 28, www.globaltimes.cn.
———. 2013b. “Time to Regulate Air Defense Zone to Prevent Conflict.”
South China Morning Post, November 29.
Van Dyke, Jon M. 2013. “The Romania-Ukraine Decision and Its Effect on
East Asian Maritime Delimitations.” In Jon M. Van Dyke, Sherry P.
Broder, Seokwoo Lee, and Jin-Hyun Paik, eds., Governing Ocean
Resources. Leiden, Netherlands: Klondike and Brill, pp. 43–60.
Voice of America. 2012. “Tokyo Confirms Talks with China on Island Dis-
pute.” October 24, www.voanews.com.
Walcott, John, and A. R. Lakshmanan. 2012. “Clinton Warned of Military
Danger in China-Japan Dispute.” Bloomberg Businessweek, November
2, www.businessweek.com.
Walt, Stephen M. 2013. “Senkaku Clash Could Draw in U.S.: Think Tank.”
Japan Times, February 21, www.japantimes.co.jp.
Watt, Louise. 2012. “China’s Lines Around Islands Suggest More Conflict
Ahead.” Associated Press, September 30, www.chinapost.com.tw.
Watts, Jonathan. 2008. “China and Japan Agree on Joint Gas Exploration of
East China Sea.” The Guardian, June 18, www.theguardian.com.
Mark J. Valencia 217
White, Harry. 2013. “Stand Firm in the East China Sea.” National Interest,
September 17, http://nationalinterest.org.
Xinhuanet. 2012a. “U.S. Delegation Not Entitled to China-Japan Mediation:
FM.” October 22. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english.
———. 2012b. “China Opposes U.S. Bill Concerning Diaoyu Islands.”
December 3, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
Yonhap News Agency. 2012a. “S. Korea Set to Submit Formal Claim on
East China Sea Shelf to UN.” October 22, http://english.yonhap
news.co.kr.
———. 2012b. “S. Korea Submits Formal Claim on East China Sea Shelf to
U.N.” December 27, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
Yoshida, Reiji, and Shinchi Terada. 2008. “Japan, China Strike Deal on Gas
Fields.” Japan Times, June 19, www.japantimes.co.jp.
Yuasa, Shino. 2008. “Japan Urges Chinese Ships to Leave Disputed Waters.”
Associated Press, December 8.
Yunbi, Zhang. 2012. “Noda Vows to Protect Maritime Interests.” China
Daily, October 30, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn.
———. 2013. “US-Japan Plan to Retake Islands Not True: Washington.”
China Daily, November 1, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn.
Zhong, Wu. 2008. “A President Logs On.” Asia Times Online, June 25,
www.atimes.com.
218 The East China Sea Disputes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
